Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

State of Utah, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. Steven D.
Clements, Defendant/Appellant : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
C. Kay Bryson, Laura Cabanilla, counsel for appellee.
Margaret P. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin; counsel for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Clements, No. 970411 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/962

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 970411-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2
STEVEN D. CLEMENTS,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM THE JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT
ENTERED IN THIS CASE BY THE HONORABLE JOHN C. BACKLUND
FROM CONVICTIONS OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL,
A CLASS A MISDEMENOR, AND OPEN CONTAINER, A CLASS C MISDEMEANOR

C. KAY BRYSON
Utah County Attorney
LAURA CABANILLA
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Counsel for Appellee

mm

COURT OF APPEALS - ^
BRM^

UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFy
I
^#V_-»\_'0 «£

rtun

QlQ*M{—

MARGARET P . LINDSAY

(6766)

'-Vj* A l d r i c h , Nelson, Weight & E s p l i n
. % 43 East 200 North
••:'% P . O . Box " L "
,."£ Provo, Utah 84603
vV[§5 Telephone: (801) 373-4J
(^A

— ** Counsel for A p p e l l a n t

FILED
OEC - h 1997

COURT OF APPEALS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature of the Case

2

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

2

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I

A.

B.

THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT
THEIR DECISION WAS NOT DIFFICULT, THAT IT
INVOLVED ONLY ONE ISSUE ON ONE COUNT, AND THAT
THEIR VERDICT MUST BE EITHER "GUILTY" OR
"NOT GUILTY" IS AN IMPERMISSIBLY COERCIVE
ALLEN INSTRUCTION

9

The language of the trial court's instruction
was coercive per se and requires reversal
by this Court

12

The trial court's instruction was also
coercive under "the specific circumstances
of the case."

14

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

17

ADDENDA

18

Rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
Allen instruction from the Trial Transcript

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutory Provisions
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44

2

Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.20

2

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e)

1

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 19

2, 11

Cases Cited
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154 (1896)..11, 16
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059 (1965)

13

State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992)

12

State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23(Utah App. 1988)

ii

....

1, 2, 12-16

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 970411-CA

vs.
STEVEN D. CLEMENTS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:
:

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(e)

(1997).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's instruction to the jury that their

decision was not difficult—that it involved only one issue on
one charge—and that there verdict had to be either "guilty" or
"not guilty" constituted a coercive use of an Allen charge?
Appellate review of an Allen charge is not barred where counsel
was not forewarned of the instruction and had no opportunity to
know of, or object to, it until after it was given to the jury.
State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1988).
In reviewing the trial court's Allen charge, this Court must
consider whether the language of the supplemental charge can
properly be said to be coercive per
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se,

or whether it is coercive

under the specific circumstances of the case."

Lactod, 761 P.2d

at 30, 31.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
which addresses jury instructions is set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Steven D. Clements appeals from the judgment, sentence and
commitment imposed by the Honorable John C. Backlund after a jury
trial where he was convicted of Driving under the Influence of
Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, and Open Container, a class C
misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Clements was charged by information with Driving under the
Influence of Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated Section 41-6-44, and Open Container, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 41-644.20 on or about July 15, 1996 (R. 2-3).
On May 28, 1997, a jury trial was held in this matter in the
Orem Department, Fourth District Court, the Honorable John C.
Backlund presiding (R. 113-14, 141) . After the jury had
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deliberated for approximately two hours, they were "invited" back
in the courtroom and the following dialogue took place:
THE COURT:

We'll go on the record now....

counsel are present, as is Mr. Clements.

Both

We have invited

the six members of the jury to come into the court.

Members

of the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict?

And

who is your foreperson?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

Well, they said I would be.
We'll its now 7:30 and the jury has been

deliberating approximately two hours.

It would be my

proposal that we recess at this time.

We have this calendar

every Wednesday at 1 o'clock.

If you can't reach a verdict

this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday,
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while
you're in the jury room.

Then you can take as long as you

need to arrive at a verdict.
Do you think that will be worthwhile?

Or if you think

that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you
can tell me that also.

If you just don't think you can

unanimously agree on a verdict on each count.
MR. HALL;

Some of us think we should go back in for

two minutes.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's do that, then.

have you brought back out in five minutes, then.
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We will
If you

can't, then we will have to figure out something else to do.
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this
evening.

This is not a complicated case.

There's only one

real issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or
"no".

You have to make up your minds, folks.

So we'll have

you brought out again in five minutes, then
(Tr. transcript ["Tr."] at 137-39).
After this dialogue the jury deliberated for another five
minutes and returned with a verdict of "guilty" on both counts
(Tr. at 139-40).

Clements was sentenced to one year in the Utah

State Prison consecutive to the sentence he was serving in
another case and a $2500.00 fine (R. 117, Tr. at 143). On June
27, 1997, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court and
this action followed (R. 134).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 31, 1996, at approximately midnight, Harold "Skip"
Curtis, a deputy with the Utah County Sheriff's Department was
dispatched to the Maple Bench Campground in Payson Canyon on a
report of intoxicated individuals in the campground (Tr. at 41).
When Curtis arrived he was directed by the campground host to a
Ford Explorer that was parked in camp No 4 (Tr. at 42).
reported to Curtis that the driver of the vehicle, Steven
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It was

Clements, had been disturbing other campers before returning to
his vehicle (Id.).
Curtis approached the Explorer and found Clements and a
female passenger "either passed out or sleeping" (Tr. at 43).
Curtis then knocked on the door but received no response (Id.).
Curtis then opened the door, called in, and Clements sat back and
began to yell (Id.).

Curtis testified that after Clements calmed

down, he requested identification, which Clements took out of his
wallet with a bit of trouble (Tr. at 43-44).

Curtis also

testified that he could smell a strong odor of alcohol in the
vehicle; and that the radio was on and the keys were in the
ignition (Tr. at 44). Curtis then called for backup because of
Clements1 "loud boisterous manner" and "threats of physical
violence" (Id.).
While waiting for backup, Curtis blocked the Explorer's path
with his patrol car (Tr. at 46). When Officer Morgan arrived,
Clements, who was again laid back in the seat either asleep or
passed out, was told to exit the vehicle (Id.).

Curtis testified

that Clements again became verbally aggressive (Tr. at 47).
Clements stumbled exiting the vehicle and could not stand up
without holding on to the vehicle (Id.).
Curtis then placed Clements under arrest for driving under
the influence of alcohol (Id.).

Curtis testified that an

intoxilyzer test was done and the result was .157 (Tr. at 48).
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Curtis searched Clements' vehicle and found a open bottle of gin
on the floor of the passenger's side (Tr. at 49). Curtis
testified that Clements admitted to having two beers and that
"they were going to sleep it off for a few minutes and then he
was going to drive them home" (Tr. at 49-50).
Curtis also testified that no one had witnessed Clements
driving the Explorer (Tr. at 52); and that the motor was not
running when he approached the vehicle (Tr. at 53). Curtis
testified further that after Clements had been arrested and he
returned to deal with the passenger the keys to the vehicle were
found in the passenger's waistband at some point by Officer
Morgan; and that the passenger was still asleep and appeared to
be in the same position (Tr. at 55, 56). In addition, Curtis
testified that both Clements and the passenger believed they were
in a canyon near Vernal (Tr. at 45, 58).
Officer Mike Morgan, a sergeant employed by the Utah County
Sheriff's Department, testified that he assisted Curtis at the
Maple Bench Campground (Tr. at 64-65).

Morgan and Curtis

approached the vehicle, eventually roused Clements, identified
themselves, and asked Clements to exit the vehicle (Tr. at 6667).

Clements was so intoxicated he thought the sleeping bag he

and the sleeping passenger were sharing was a coat (Tr. at 67).
Morgan testified that after Clements was arrested, Curtis
informed him that the vehicle's keys were in the ignition (Tr. at
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69).

However, when Morgan returned to the car to deal with the

passenger, there were no keys in the ignition (Id.).

Morgan then

got the passenger out of the car and he testified that she told
him that the keys were not in the car and that Clements had
driven them there (Tr. at 72-74) .

The passenger also told Morgan

that she and Clements had planned on camping at the campground
(Tr. at 86). Morgan later found the keys in the waistband of the
passenger's waistband (Tr. at 76). Morgan also testified that
the passenger admitted to lying about the keys so Clements
wouldn't be arrested for DUI (Tr. at 77). The Explorer belonged
to the passenger (Tr. at 84) .
Wayne Crook, a friend of Clements, testified that late in
the afternoon on May 31, 1996, Clements and the passenger came to
his house up Payson Canyon and that the three of them went into
the canyon to drink (Tr. at 90-91).

Clements and the passenger

went up to the Grotto area of Payson canyon first and then were
joined by Crook, his son and a border who had stopped first at
the liquor store in Payson (Tr. at 92, 94). Crook testifed that
Clements and the passenger had been drinking very little before
going up the canyon (Tr. at 93). Crook testified that he
believed that the passenger drove the Explorer when they left his
house (Tr. at 93) .

Crook testified that the group—except

Crook's son—drank both at the Grotto and at Look-out Point (Tr.
at 101-02).
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After leaving the Grotto, Clements rode with Crook, and
Crook's son drove the passenger in the Explorer up to look-out
point and then down to the campground (Tr. at 94-96).
Crook testified that Clements and the passenger planned to
camp in Payson canyon and had borrowed a sleeping bag from him
(Tr. at 96). Approximately 10-15 minutes after arriving at the
campground, Crook took possession of the Explorer's keys from his
son and told Clements that he would bring the keys up in the
morning (Tr. at 97) . Crook did this because Clements "was
getting pretty wild there, and [the passenger] was causing a lot
of arguments and she was totally gone" (Tr. at 106). Crook
testified that after his conversation with Clements, he gave the
keys to the passenger because she demanded them and because it
was her vehicle (Tr. at 98, 107-08) . During the conversation
with the passenger Clements was in the Explorer 15-25 feet away
talking with the border (Tr. at 99). Crook, his son, and the
border then left the campground.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A supplemental verdict-urging instruction to a deliberating
jury that has been unable to reach an unanimous verdict is not
prohibited provided the instruction is not coercive per

se or

coercive under the specific circumstances of the case.

In this

case, the trial court's instruction is both coercive per
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se and

coercive under the context and circumstances of the case.
tlip
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the jury that they were required to reach a verdict of either
"guilry" or "noL guilt.y".

Two, the instruction was coercive when

viewed in the context of the trial because of the significant
colloquy between the judge and jury, because the judge threatened
to make the jury return next week if they could not immediately
reach a verdict, and because The jury, in fact, rendered a
verdict of "guilty" on both counts almost immediately after the
instruction was given.

Accordingly, Clements asks rhis Conn: to

reverse his convictions because of the "manifest injustice"
caused by The trial court's erroneously coercive supplemental
instruction to the jury.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY THAT
THEIR DECISION WAS NOT DIFFICULT,
THAT IT INVOLVED ONLY ONE ISSUE ON ONE COUNT,
AND THAT THEIR VERDICT MUST BE EITHER "GUILTY" OR "NOT GUILTY"
IS AN IMPERMISSIBLY COERCIVE ALLEN INSTRUCTION
Clements was charged with two separate offenses:

Open

Container and Driving under The Influence of Alcohol; and born
charges were submitted to a jury for a decision.
had been

After the jury

deliberating for approximately T W O hours on The charges,
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they were "invited" into the courtroom and the following dialogue
ensued:
THE COURT:

We'll go on the record now....

counsel are present, as is Mr. Clements.

Both

We have invited

the six members of the jury to come into the court.

Members

of the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict?

And

who is your foreperson?
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

Well, they said I would be.
We'll its now 7:30 and the jury has been

deliberating approximately two hours.

It would be my

proposal that we recess at this time.

We have this calendar

every Wednesday at 1 o'clock.

If you can't reach a verdict

this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock next Wednesday,
and that I handle other cases and other calendar while
you're in the jury room.

Then you can take as long as you

need to arrive at a verdict.
Do you think that will be worthwhile?

Or if you think

that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this time, you
can tell me that also.

If you just don't think you can

unanimously agree on a Verdict on each count.
MR. HALL:

Some of us think we should go back in for

two minutes.
THE COURT:

All right.

Let's do that, then.

have you brought back out in five minutes, then.
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We will
If you

can't, then we will have to figure out something else to do.
I would sincerely hope that you can reach a verdict this
evening.

This is not a complicated case.

There's only one

real issue here on the one count, and it's either "yes" or
"no".

You have to make up your minds, folks.

So we'll have

you brought out again in five minutes, then
(Tr. transcript ["Tr."] at 137-39).

After this dialogue the jury

deliberated very briefly and returned with a verdict of "guilty"
on both counts (Tr. at 139-40).
Clements asserts that the trial court's dialogue with the
jury is a "verdict urging" instruction akin to an "Allen charge"
which takes its name from the case of Allen v. United States, 164
U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896).

In Allen, the

United States Supreme Court approved of a supplemental
instruction to a jury having difficulty in reaching an unanimous
verdict.

Allen, 164 U.S. at 501.

Although Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that appellate review can only be sought for erroneous
instructions if an objection was made at trial, Rule 19 also
grants this Court the power to assign error to instructions "in
order to avoid a manifest injustice".

U.R.Cr.P. Rule 19(c).

Specifically this Court has previously held that appellate review
would not be barred where counsel had no forewarning of the
issuance of a verdict-urging instruction, and "had no opportunity
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to know of or object to the allegedly harmful portion of the
instruction until after it was given to the jury."

State v.

Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 29 (Utah App. 1988).
This case falls squarely within the Lactod exception for
appellate review.

The trial court invited the jury into the

courtroom and engaged in the aforementioned dialogue without any
warning to counsel or any opportunity for input or objection from
counsel.

Accordingly, this Court should review the propriety of

the trial court's verdict-urging instruction to the jury in this
case.
Over the years, many courts—including this Court—have
expressed concern that an Allen-type supplemental instruction
could be potentially coercive—depending on its contents and
context.

See, State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992);

Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 30-31 (Utah App. 1988).

In reviewing the

propriety of the trial court's Allen instruction this Court must
consider whether the language of the supplemental charge can
properly be said to be coercive per

se,

and if not, then whether

it is coercive under the specific circumstances of this case.
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30, 31.
A.

The language of the trial court's instruction was coercive
per se and requires reversal by this Court.
In Lactod, this Court for the first time was called upon to

decide the identical issue at stake here.

This Court decided

that the trial court's instruction was not coercive per
12

se

because the instruction in Lactod "did not tell the jury that it
was required to reach a decision." 761 P.2d at 31.
admonition constitutes a per
be reversed.1

Such an

se coercive instruction which must

As this Court noted in Lactod, it is "a

misstatement of law that a criminal case must be decided at some
time." 761 P.2d at 31 (citations omitted).
The relevant part of the trial court's instruction in Lactod
consisted of:

"I want to encourage you as best you can to reach

some kind of agreement.... If you don't reach an agreement and
the jury hangs up and cannot come to any kind of agreement we get
to send you folks home and reschedule this whole thing and start
over again.... We would very much like to get a settlement out of
this matter if we can.

761 P.2d at 28.

On the other hand, the trial court in this case explicitly
told the jury that they had to reach either a "guilty" or "not
guilty" verdict:

"This is not a complicated case.

There's only

one real issue here on the one count, and it's either 'yes' or
'no.'

You have to make up your minds, folks" (Tr. at 138-39).

Accordingly, because the jury was told they had to reach a
decision, the language used by the trial court in instructing the
jury was coercive per

se and requires reversal by this Court.

l

See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct.
1059, 1060 (1965) (per curiam).
13

B.

The trial court's instruction was also coercive under "the
specific circumstances of the case."
After determining that the instruction in Lactod was not

coercive per

se,

this Court considered whether the instruction

"under the specific circumstances of the case" was coercive.

761

P.2d at 31. Relevant factors in assessing the "coercive effect
include 'any colloquy between the judge and the jury foreman,
[and] circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction....
'" Id.
In Lactod^ this Court ultimately decided that the Allen
instruction at issue was not coercive because "we think the jury
understood that the judge was not intending to force a verdict
one way or the other, but, rather, was merely encouraging the
jurors to reach an agreement, if possible."
32.

Lactod, 761 P.2d at

However, the context and circumstances surrounding the Allen

instruction given to the jury in Lactod is distinctly different
from the specific circumstances surrounding the trial court's
instruction in this case.
One, in Lactod "there were no significant colloquies between
the judge and the jury foreman."

761 P.2d at 31.

In this case

their was a running dialogue between the jury foreman and the
trial court.

In fact, when the jury was told that if they could

not reach a verdict that evening then they would have to come
back next week, the foreman stated "Some of us think we should go
back in for two minutes" (Tr. at 138). To which the trial court
14

replied:

"All right.

Let's do that, then.

brought back out in five minutes, then.

We will have you

If you can't, then we

will have to figure out something else to do" (Id.).
Two, in Lactod the jury deliberated for another hour and
fifteen minutes after receiving the instruction.

761 P.2d at 31.

In this case, however, it can be inferred from the colloquy
between the judge and jury that the jury returned a verdict of
"guilty" on both counts almost immediately after receiving the
instruction (Tr. at 137-40) .
Three, in Lactod "the judge did not threaten to or keep the
jury deliberating for an unreasonable length of time."
at 31.

7 61 P.2d

Specifically the trial court told the jury that if they

could not reach an agreement then "I'm not going to let you go
too much longer."

Lactod, 761 P.2d at 28.

To the contrary,

Judge Backlund told the jury that they would have to come back in
a week to finish their deliberation if they could not reach an
agreement:

"Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has bee

deliberating approximately two hours.
that we recess at this time.

Wednesday at 1 o'clock.
evening,

Fife have

If you can't

that we reconvene

at 1 o'clock

It would be my proposal
this

every

reach a verdict

this

next Wednesday. . . then

you can take as long as you need to arrive
138)(emphasis added).

calendar

at a verdict11

(Tr. at

It was this dialogue which caused the jury

to ask for "two" more minutes of deliberation (Id.).
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Four, in Lactod the trial court told the jury to "Be open
minded, understanding.

Be compromising as best you can without

surrendering your honest and true feelings, because we don't want
you to go in there and let everybody walk all over you."
P.2d at 28.

761

In this case, Judge Backlund gave the jury no such

reminder that "the verdict must be the verdict of each
individual, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his
fellows
at 157).

" Lactod, 761 P.2d at 32 n.2 (quoting Allen, 17 S.Ct.
In fact, in addition to compelling a verdict from the

jury in this case, Judge Backlund also inappropriately commented
on the strength of the evidence in this case by emphatically
admonishing the jury that "This is not a complicated case.
There's only one real issue here on the one count, and it's
either 'yes' or

f

no f " (Tr. at 138-39).

Although Clements was

being charged with two separate crimes which each contained
numerous elements, Judge Backlund usurped the role of the jury as
fact-finder by telling them that only one element of one count
was at issue.
Because of the significant colloquy between the judge and
the jury, because the jury's verdict came almost immediately
after the instruction, because the judge threatened to make the
jury come back next week if they could not reach a decision, and
because the trial court inappropriately commented on the
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evidence, this Court should find that the instruction taken as a
whole and in context with the trial itself was coercive.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Clements asks this Court to reverse his conviction for
Driving under the Influence of Alcohol and Open Container because
the trial court's Allen instruction to the jury was both coercive
per

se

and coercive under the specif circumstances of this case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

O

day of December, 1997.

^ A ^ ^ Q « Vv^l

Margarey P. Lindsay
J<^
Counsel for Steven D. Clements

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief to Laura Cabanilla, Deputy Utah
County Attorney, 100 E. Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606
this

<?

day of December, 1997.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 19

Rule 19* Instructions,
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonbly directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the
^ y on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
Lquests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
ghall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions
in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of submitting.
Elements of offense.
Failure to request or object.
—Review without objection.
Objections.
—Failure to object.
—Specificity.
—Time.
Presumptions.
Requests by jury.
Specific instructions.
—Circumstantial evidence.
—Elements of offense.
—Lesser included offenses.
—Unreliability of eyewitness identification.
—Verdict-urging instruction.
Untimely request.
Cited.
Effect of submitting.
When an instruction is submitted by a party,
that same party cannot later object to it; he has
already waived any objection and endorsed it
as legally sound. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
When a party submits more than one instruction on a single issue, it is reasonable to
assume that one instruction represents that
party's preferred position, while the others represent backup positions. Therefore, the party
cannot complain when the court uses only one
of the requested instructions. State v. Perdue,
813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Elements of offense.
An information instruction is not a substitute for an elements instruction. The jury must
be instructed with respect to all the legal elements that it must find to convict of the crime
charged, and the absence of such an instruction

is reversible error as a matter of law. Failure
to give the instruction can never be harmless
error. State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059 (Utah
1991).
Even though defendant failed to object to the
lack of an elements instruction when the instructions were given, trial court's complete
failure to give an elements instruction was
clear error and required reversal of his conviction and remand for a new trial. State v. Jones,
823 P.2d 1059 (Utah 1991).
Failure to request or object
Where a defendant does not request an instruction on a certain subject, he cannot later
claim that the trial court's failure to instruct
on that subject is error. State v. Cowan, 26
Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971).
Except when necessary to avoid manifest injustice, this rule prohibits the assigning as
error the trial court's failure to give a jury instruction where no objection is made before the
jury is instructed. State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d
56 (Utah 1982), overruled on other grounds,
721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
Where oral admissions of defendant in a
criminal trial are introduced without an instruction that such evidence ought to be
viewed with caution, there is no error as long
as such an instruction has not been specifically
requested, especially in a case where the subject matter is generally covered by the instructions that are given. State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d
785 (Utah 1984).
When faced with a claim that a particular
assertion of instructional error not raised at
trial should be considered on appeal because
failure to do so would result in "manifest injustice" under Subdivision (c), the Supreme Court
will determine whether to review such a claim

of the witnesses who have testified, it's the State's
position that you will return a verdict to convict the
defendant of both charges.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Court would like to thank

both counsel for their presentation of the case to the
jury.

If I can have Ms. Stevensen stand, please, I will

administer the oath to her to take charge of the jury.
Ms. Stevensen, do you solemnly swear that you
will take charge of this jury and take them to some
private and convenient place where they may deliberate
upon their verdict, allowing no one to speak to them, nor
to do so yourself, unless so ordered by the Court, and to
return them into court when they have so reached such a
verdict or when so ordered, so help you God?
COURT CLERK: I do.
THE COURT: Thank you.

The Court will be in

recess, then, as the jury deliberates.

So members of the

jury, if you'll go with Ms. Stevensen, she'll take you to
the jury room.
(Recess taken while jury deliberates)
THE COURT: We'll go on the record now in the
matter of State versus Steven Clements.
are present, as is Mr. Clements.

Both counsel

We have invited the six

members of the jury to come into the court.

Members of

the jury, have you been able to arrive at a verdict?
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And

who is your foreperson?
MR. HALL: Well, they said I would be.
THE COURT: Okay, then.

Mr. Hall, you are the

foreperson, and has the jury been able to arrive at a
verdict on each count, sir?
THE COURT: Well, it's now 7:30 and the jury has
been deliberating approximately two hours.
proposal that we recess at this time.
calendar every Wednesday at 1 o'clock.

It would be my

We have this
If you can't reach

a verdict this evening, that we reconvene at 1 o'clock
next Wednesday, and that I handle other cases and other
calendar while you're in the jury room.

Then you can take

as long as you need to to arrive at a verdict.
Do you think that will be worthwhile?

Or if you

think that you're unable to arrive at a verdict at this
time, you can tell me that also.

If you just don't think

you can unanimously agree on a verdict on each count.
MR. HALL: Some of us think we should go back in
for two minutes.
THE COURT: All right.

Let's do that, then.

We

will have you brought back out in five minutes, then.
If you can't, then we will have to figure out something
else to do.

I would sincerely hope that you can reach a

verdict this evening.

This is not a complicated case.

There's only one real issue here on the one count, and
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it's either "yes" or "no./1
minds, folks.

You have to make up your

So we'll have you brought out again in

five minutes, then.
(Recess taken while jury further deliberates)
THE COURT: We're on the record now in the matter
of State versus Steven D. Clements, and he is present with
Counsel.

The prosecutor is present, and the jury members

are present, seated in the jury box.

Mr. Hall is acting

as jury foreperson.
Mr. Hall, has the jury been able to arrive at a
verdict on each count?
MR. HALL: Yes, we have.
THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Stevensen, would you

go to the jury box, please, and retrieve the verdict forms
from Mr. Hall.

Then I will read those into the*record.

Thank you.
Before I read the verdict into the record,
let me thank the jury.

I think you've been extremely

conscientious and you've spent a great deal of time,
obviously, analyzing the evidence.

In behalf of the

parties of this case we thank you for your time today.
Again, we apologize to you for the late starting time.
I will read the verdicts, then, in the order
that I've been given them.

"We, the jury, find the

defendant Steven D. Clements guilty of the offense of
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open container."

The second reads, "We, the jury, find

the defendant Steven D. Clements guilty of driving under
the influence of alcohol."
The Court will discharge the jury at this time.
You are free to go, folks, and thank you so much.

So

we'll excuse you at this time with our thanks for service
well done.

The easiest way I think would be just to go

right out through this door out the front, wouldn't it,
Carla?

You will not be called during the rest of this

jury term, since you now have served on a jury that has
rendered a verdict.

So thank you so much.

(Jury exits the courtroom)
THE COURT: Mr. Clements, the law provides that
you return for sentencing after 2 days and within 45 days,
or you may waive that time and be sentenced now.

Do you

prefer to come back for sentencing -- if you'd like to
confer with your attorney and make that decision —

or

would you rather be sentenced today?
(Counsel conferring with defendant off the record)
MR. GALE: We would waive the sentencing time
period, Judge, and just ask for the Court to grant
sentence today.
THE COURT: All right.

Well, it's obvious that

Mr. Clements has at least two prior DUI's within the six
years.

So are you aware of anything else I should know
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